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Abstract— Security is one of the most important issues in the 
Internet of Things (IoT). The Mirai botnet case in September 
2016 revealed a serious vulnerability in IoT devices. 
Researchers try to mitigate the issues using several 
approaches. One of them uses Blockchain for the solution. At 
first, the integration of the Blockchain on IoT seems 
promising. However, there are problems in resource 
consumption and latency. Several solutions emerge to make 
Blockchain uses low resource consumption i.e., LSB and 
FogBus. Unfortunately, each solution has its weaknesses. 
FogBus has a weakness in integrity, whereas LSB has a 
weakness in its availability when an attack occurs on a broker. 
We introduce Lightweight Multi-Fog (LMF) Blockchain 
Model to increase availability in the LSB model. The main 
idea is increasing the integrity availability by splitting location 
based on Broadcast Domains while using Fog Computing on 
each Broadcast Domain. An attack in some Broadcast Domain 
cannot impact transactions and process in other Broadcast 
Domain and each Broadcast Domain have its separate 
transaction and process. LMF enhances the integrity and 
availability of the Light Blockchain Model. However, it still 
requires simulations in the future to get a better 
understanding of LMF performance, resource consumption, 
and latency. 
Keywords— Blockchain, Fog Computing, IoT, Lightweight, 
Network. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) is a recent widely used 
technology that makes everything possible to connect to the 
internet and communicate with each other. IoT sometimes 
refers to Machine to Machine (M2M) [1]. It is slightly 
different because there is not only communication among 
machines but also people involved in communication. 
Another difference is IoT uses sensor technology and 
wireless communication with low power usage [2]. The 
most interesting part of this technology is not limited to the 
automation industry, but also about the way we live in our 
home. The technology is called a smart home. One example 
of the implementation is to make the garage door 
automatically opened when people come home [3].  
There are security risks in rapid IoT implementation [4]. 
One of the biggest issues is the Mirai botnet attack in 
September 2016. Mirai attack in 2016 is the biggest 
problem in IoT. This reveals a serious vulnerability in IoT 
devices. Mirai uses BASHLITE in a DDoS attack on Krebs 
on Security website on September 20, 2016. Ars Technica 
also reports several attacks on the French website [5]. 
This attack also happened to one DNS Service Provider, 
Dyn, on October 21, 2016. They are attacked by Mirai 
malware that is installed on a large number of IoT devices. 
Therefore, big websites i.e. GitHub, Twitter, Reddit, 
Netflix, Airbnb, and many others are inaccessible. At the 
end of November 2016, around 900,000 Arcadya’s routers 
at Deutsche Telekom are also inaccessible during hacking 
attempts using failed TR-064. This is a variant of Mirai 
malware that causes Internet connectivity problems [6]. 
Mirai attack started by the attacker by taking control of 
Control Server and then the attacker installs BASHLITE 
program on the server to launch massive DDoS attack on 
the network like in Figure 1. The main reason IoT devices 
easier to attack, due to the lack of security and the patches 
are rarely released. 
Fig. 1. Mirai Botnet Attack Flows [6] 
According to many surveys conducted by the 
researcher, they find that not only cameras are vulnerable 
[7]. CCTV systems and cable boxes are also vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. The vulnerability of the IoT device is also 
related to the lack of awareness of IoT devices 
manufacturers in designing their devices [7]. 
There are many solutions provided by researchers to 
mitigate this issue. One of them is to integrate the 
Blockchain with IoT technology [8], [9], [10]. Blockchain 
is introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008. It is introduced 
as the technology behind BitCoin as a digital currency 
system. It uses peer to peer communication similar to 
BitTorrent. Blockchain consists block of data that is 
connected like a chain. Everyone can be a miner, an entity 
that has the authority to solve the cryptography puzzle, 
known as Proof of Work (PoW) and add a new block to the 
Blockchain. When a transaction occurs, transaction 
information will be broadcast to the entire network. Then 
each miner validates and signs the transaction and adds the 
transaction data to their block [8]. Many solutions have 
been provided by researchers. However, Blockchain is 
predicted as focused research to secure IoT [11] 
The new Blockchain-based Multi-Layer Secure 
Network Model is proposed as a combination of the 
centralized and decentralized IoT Network Model and 
enhances its security using the Blockchain [8]. This 
mechanism requires large computational resources that are 
very limited on IoT devices [12]. Most IoT devices have 
low power [13]. Another thing, the time that is needed to 
complete a transaction by Blockchain is rather huge, for 
example in Bitcoin can take up to 30 minutes for 
transaction to be confirmed. This delay is not acceptable for 
IoT communication [14]. Another research also notes the 
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same problem when integrating the Blockchain into IoT 
[15], [16]. 
Reducing the computing resources and reducing delays 
for completing transactions are the only way that the 
Blockchain can be used in the IoT network. Several 
researchers [17] try to use the Blockchain on IoT. However, 
instead of using it on IoT transactions, they use it only as an 
authentication and authorization scheme on IoT. This 
solution does not solve the problems that occur when 
integrating the Blockchain into the IoT. It is only applying 
the Blockchain as a AAA mechanism in IoT. 
Another researcher [18] propose an Ethereum-based 
algorithm to integrate the Blockchain in IoT called 
BeeKeeper. However, the latency is still categorized as high 
with more than 10 seconds for block intervals. Other 
research proposes a Fog and Cloud-based algorithm [10] 
called FogBus. It integrates the Blockchain into IoT, but it 
is lack of detailed security. 
The most notable research to integrate the Blockchain 
into IoT is to implement a new consensus algorithm called 
Lightweight Scalable Blockchain (LSB). LSB uses direct 
and indirect evidence to reduce the latency used by 
transactions that must be completed. Time-based consensus 
algorithms are placed rather than Proof of Work (PoW) or 
Proof of Stake (PoS) [14]. Miners or Brokers in an overlay 
network are called Overlay Broker Managers (OBM) and 
Miners or Brokers in Local Networks are called Local 
Broker Managers (LBM). OBM uses asymmetric 
encryption, whereas LBM uses symmetric encryption. This 
last consensus still has availability issues. One of the issues 
is performance degradation to all nodes when multiple 
nodes are attacked. 
LSB and FogBus are the most complete solutions to 
solve Blockchain and IoT integration problems using 
different approaches. However, both have their weaknesses. 
LSB topology does not elaborate on the details of 
communication among OBMs at the network level. Since 
all OBMs broadcast each other in overlay networks, it can 
be assumed that all OBMs are in the same broadcast 
domain. Therefore, when an OBM is attacked, it is possible 
that the attack also targets other OBMs in the same overlay 
network. Whenever there is a DDoS attack occurs to an 
OBM, not only attack a node, the transaction verification 
services can be limited to several unisolated OBMs and 
nodes. An additional intermediate layer can be used to 
reduce this issue by dividing the broadcast domain. 
Therefore, attacks on one broadcast domain will not affect 
other broadcast domains. However, the FogBus framework 
is not tested against several attack scenarios. The latency is 
still 50-300% higher than without using the Blockchain 
[10]. 
We introduce Lightweight Multi Fog (LMF) Model to 
mitigate the IoT security risk. We integrate the LSB and 
FogBus algorithm. To mitigate both possible weaknesses, 
we implement the LSB mechanism in the FogBus 
framework and break the FCN into separate broadcast 
domains. It reduces the delay in FogBus and increases the 
security factor by separating the broadcast domain in LSB 
without losing the advantages of the Blockchain 
mechanism. 
II. LIGHTWEIGHT MULTI-FOG BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we discuss the Lightweight Multi-Fog 
Design in detail. We begin by defining three fundamental 
concepts: 
• Transaction: Typical protocol used for information
communication flow before transmitting data in the
network among each node.
• Broadcast Domain: Network Domain where only all
nodes in the same Domain receive all packet
broadcast from each node.
• Broker: A node in the same broadcast domain that
acts as manager. This node is responsible for
managing blockchain transactions stored on each
node, also verify and authorize the transaction.
A. Lightweight Multi Fog (LMF) Blockchain Architecture 
FogBus [10] categorizes each Layer based on three 
technologies i.e., IoT Layer, Fog Layer, and Cloud Layer. 
While LSB [14] does not categorize each layer. Therefore, 
it is difficult to determine the functions that run on each 
layer. Lightweight Multi Fog (LMF) uses a different 
layering system. LMF uses a function to distinguish each 
layer. LMF consists of four layers i.e., Access Layer, 
Network Layer, Computing Layer, and Application Layer, 
presented in Figure 2. 
Access Layer is the lowest layer that consists of IoT 
devices and sensors. This layer has a connection to the 
Internet or private networks. Hence, LMF can be 
implemented on both public or private networks. In public 
networks, each device and sensor must be connected to the 
internet. It usually applies to Smart Public Applications. In 
private networks, each device or sensor must be able to 
reach the gateway in the Network Layer. Since the data are 
not exposed to the public network, it usually applies to 
Intelligent Industrial Systems. 
Network Layer is the layer that runs the network 
function on the LMF architecture. The Network Layer 
functions as a gateway. It routes data to Blockchain Broker 
and Blockchain Nodes. The Network Layer also acts as a 
gateway for each Broadcast Domain. Since each Broadcast 
Domain has one Broker and several Nodes, the Network 
Layer has at least one router. Each Broadcast Domain can 
also be represented as City, Province or Country. Hence, 
the Broadcast Domains is equal to the number of Cities, 
Provinces or Countries where the service is implemented. 
Compute Layer consists of at least one Blockchain 
Broker and several Blockchain Nodes in every Broadcast 
Domain. By default, the nodes only process transactions 
from its Broker in the same Broadcast Domain. During 
Broker unavailability, any resource-available node in the 
same broadcast domain will take over as a new Broker. 
Whenever there are no candidate nodes available in one 
broadcast domain, a node or broker in another Broadcast 
Domain will take over as a new Broker. 
Application Layer is the upper layer of LMF. It consists 
of several servers that host applications and storage. 
Transaction data is stored and processed by the application 
in this layer. 
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Fig. 2. Lightweight Multi Fog (LMF) Architecture 
B. Communication Flow 
The LMF Network Model uses Broadcast Domains to 
separate each zone. Zones represent cities or countries. This 
implementation model is used to reduce massive DDoS 
attacks on Broker Nodes. Once a DDoS attack occurs in 
one or more Brokers in their Broadcast Domains, the attack 
will not affect Brokers in other Broadcast Domains. 
1) Broadcast Domain Selection Process 
Each Broadcast Domain has its Nodes that act as 
Brokers. Other nodes act as compute layers. All of these 
nodes do not communicate with nodes in other Broadcast 
Domain nodes. Except when a Broker fails but there are no 
capable nodes to become a Broker in their Broadcast 
Domain. 
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for the broker 
selection process. Recall all nodes are stayed on the 
Blockchain, each of them will have a 'Broker Readiness 
Status'. The node that has the criteria to become a broker 
will have a value of 'TRUE'. At first, the condition of the 
node status (X.Condition) will be determined whether up or 
down (line 2). Then the value of the Broadcast Domain 
(X.BD) will be determined (line 3). If several nodes have 
the same Broadcast Domain value, the node's capacity 
(X.Capacity) will be determined next (line 4). Only a 
sufficient capacity node can become a Broker (line 5,11). 
When there are no available and capable nodes on the same 
Broadcast Domain, a node in another Broadcast Domain 
will be selected as Broker (line 9). A node with the highest 
capacity will be selected as a Broker for related Broadcast 
Domains.  
Algorithm 1 Broker Readiness Status.  
Input: Nodes (X), the Total Number of Nodes (j) 
Output: True or False  
1. for (i<=j)
2. if (X(i).Condition=1) then
3. if (X(i+1).BD=X(i).BD) then
4. if (X(i).Capacity==1)
5. return True;
6. else
7. return False;
8. end if
9. else
10. if (X(i).Capacity==1)
11. return True;
12. else
13. return False;
14. end if
15. end if
16. else
17. return False;
18. end if
19. end
2) Process and Traffic Flow 
The mechanism of LSB is the applied process and traffic 
flow. Each node in the Broadcast Domain has its own 
Public Key (PK). Each node will generate a unique PK for 
each transaction. Each block consists of the requester's hash 
PK and the target’s hash PK for this transaction. It also 
consists of the requester's hash PK for the next transaction 
[14]. This mechanism ensures that the next transaction is 
valid. It is done by comparing the requester's PK on the 
next transaction with the requester's PK that already stored 
in the previous transaction. 
A Broker also communicates with each Broker on 
different Broadcast Domains. This communication validates 
the transaction using direct and indirect evidence 
mechanisms [14]. This mechanism will reduce the time in 
the verification process. However, unlike LSB, LMF only 
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stores the blocks in the local Broadcast Domain. 
Transactions that come to a Broadcast Domain, will not be 
stored in a node on a different Broadcast. Every Broadcast 
Domain is possible to have a different Blockchain. 
Since each Broadcast Domain has its Blockchain, LMF 
has a backup mechanism using Cloud resources. Hence, 
when all nodes on Broadcast Domains unavailable, the 
blocks are still stored on Cloud Storage. There is a 
difference between the Cloud and Non-cloud Node. Each 
node can only have one Broker on their Broadcast Domain. 
However, the Cloud becomes a node for each Broker on all 
Broadcast Domains because it acts as a backup node. 
The traffic flow in LMF can be explained in Figure 3. 
The communication between a Broker and Nodes uses 
Layer 2 Network Protocol. Whereas the communication 
among Brokers in each Broadcast Domain is using Layer 3 
Network Protocol i.e., OSPF, BGP, etc. 
Figure 3. Lightweight Multi Fog (LMF) Data Flow 
Figure 3 describes the Communication Flow of Devices 
or sensors to the Nodes and Servers as follows: 
1. Traffic from Devices sent to public/private networks
uses the Routing Protocol;
2. Traffic from devices is designated to the nearest
gateway in their location, according to their zone,
city or country;
3. Traffic is checked and verified by a Broker in the
nearest Broadcast Domain. Then it will be compared
to another Broker located in other Broadcast
Domains, to verify whether valid or not;
4. Data is calculated and stored by the number of
available nodes in the local Broadcast Domain;
5. Data is also backed up in a Cloud Server. A Broker
communicates to Storage servers using asymmetric
encryption and verification through public/private
networks;
6. Communication is transferred to the Gateway where
Storage and Application Servers are located. The
Storage Server and Application Servers are located
in a different Broadcast Domain;
7. Transactions and blocks are backed up on the Cloud
Storage Server.
C. Transaction Flow Mechanism 
The two main transaction flows in LMF are Store Flow 
and Access Flow. 
1) Store Transaction
Using the LSB mechanism [14], transaction flows on the 
LMF are almost the same, except for storage locations and 
backup mechanisms. In LSB [14], users can store data 
locally or in the cloud. They also have local brokers and 
nodes in each LBM. LMF is designed so that it can be used 
generally in IoT scenarios. Hence, it does not have a local 
broker like LSB, it uses Fog computing instead. Every 
Transaction and Block in the LMF is stored on the 
Broadcast Domain Nodes located near the Device. Another 
thing, LMF has a backup mechanism, which is a transaction 
and block that is also stored on Cloud Storage if all the 
nodes and broker in a Broadcast Domain are being attacked. 
Figure 4. Store Transaction Flow 
Figure 4 describes the flow of store transactions in the 
LMF. When a user or device wants to store the transaction 
data, the user will be authenticated and authorized (S1, S2). 
Then the Application checks the nearest available Broker 
using the Public IP or Private IP Database stored previously 
in the Application (S3). Then the transaction data will be 
authenticated by a Broker using asymmetric encryption by 
validating their Public Keys. It is being validated by all 
Network Brokers (S5, S6). After the transaction is 
authorized and validated using the LSB mechanism, the 
transaction and block are stored in the node on the same 
Broadcast Domain (S7). The data are also backed up to the 
Cloud Storage Server (S8). 
Proc. EECSI 2019 - Bandung, Indonesia, 18-20 Sept 2019
186
2) Access Transaction
Figure 5. Access Transaction Flow 
Figure 5 describes the flow of access transactions in the 
LMF. When a user wants to access data, that user will be 
authenticated and authorized (A1, A2). Then the 
Application forwards the request to the relevant Broker 
where the transaction data is stored (A3). A request to 
access a transaction is authenticated by Brokers using 
asymmetric encryption by validating the application's 
Public Key and are being validated by all Brokers in the 
Network (A4, A5). After the request to access the 
transaction is authorized and validated using the LSB 
mechanism, the transaction and block from nodes are sent 
to the Application Server (A6). The Application Server 
presents data to the User (A7). 
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This section provides a security analysis of LMF design, 
based on the Security Triad i.e., Confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Availability [19]. 
1) Confidentiality
LMF is designed based on the combination of LSB 
[14]for security and lightness, and FogBus [10] for Fog 
computing and scalability. The communication among 
components i.e., Devices and a Broker, a Broker and 
Nodes, a Broker and Cloud Storage, a Broker, and 
Application, is encrypted using asymmetric encryption. 
Each Node, Broker, Device, Storage, and Application has 
its own Public Key (PK). The broker will validate the 
requester's PK with the hash of PK of the previous block. It 
will be verified by another broker using direct or indirect 
evidence [14]. Using this mechanism, each transaction is 
quite confidential for each request. Only verified and 
authorized PK can store or access the transactions.  
 User privacy is protected using changeable PK that is 
uniquely generated for each transaction. The stored 
transactions are encrypted using the requester's PK. This 
mechanism ensures anonymity and privacy. Hence, no one 
knows the requester's real identity for each transaction. 
2) Integrity
Protection against data tampering and fake transactions 
applied in LMF using hashes in other fields. LMF consists 
of two headers, transaction headers and block headers. The 
block header consists of the previous hash transaction and 
verification signature. The transaction header consists of the 
next transaction hash. Before a transaction can be validated, 
the previous transaction hash must be the same as the hash 
included in the block header. Then the hash in the 
transaction header stored in the Blockchain to be used in the 
verification of the next transaction [14] 
Broadcast Domain Separation. There is a difference 
between LMF and LSB in terms of the use of period-
consensus mechanisms. The consensus period is used when 
fake transactions try to access data in the Blockchain. A 
Broker is limited to one block that can be generated during 
a period of consensus-period intervals [14]. In LMF, by 
using Broadcast Domain Separation, only Broker on the 
same Broadcast Domain that can store and access the 
transaction and requestor transaction only stored on the 
Broadcast Domain nearest their location. In case of attacks, 
the attacks on some Broadcast Domain cannot impact the 
transactions and processes in other Broadcast Domain, 
because they cannot store the transaction in nodes on 
different Broadcast Domain. 
Location Verification. Since the LMF does not use a 
consensus period, the LMF mitigates this issue by verifying 
the location of the request. A Requester cannot store 
transactions in another Broadcast Domain when there are 
available Broker and Nodes in the nearest Broadcast 
Domain. An attempt to make a transaction to another 
Broadcast Domain instead of the nearest Broadcast Domain 
can be categorized as fake transactions. Except when there 
are no Brokers available in their nearest Broadcast Domain. 
Transaction Separation. LMF also has protection on 
Broadcast Domains where the Cloud Storage Server and 
Application server are located. Only brokers can request to 
store data on the Cloud Storage Server. There is no direct 
access from the Users to the Cloud Storage Server. 
Broadcast Domain separation mechanism in LMF can also 
comply with “data localization regulation” that was 
implemented in some countries since each Broadcast 
Domain did not store transaction data to another Broadcast 
Domain. 
3) Availability
 LMF uses the advantages of FogBus and LSB for its 
availability. On LSB, when a Broker is not available, the 
Nodes will choose another Broker to be associated with 
[14]. Whereas in FogBus, when a Broker is not available, 
each worker node can become a Broker [10]. LMF 
combines both availability mechanisms.  
LMF Fault Tolerance. Once the existing Broker is not 
available, the node in the same Broadcast Domain will 
become Broker if available and have sufficient resources. If 
there are no available nodes in the same Broadcast Domain, 
Broker or nodes from nearest Broadcast Domain will take 
over the nodes with no Broker in their Broadcast Domain. 
This fault-tolerance mechanism ensures availability in the 
LMF Blockchain Model while separating Broadcast 
Domains to represent each City, Province or Country. 
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 Broadcast Domain Separation. Broadcast Domain 
Implementation is the main advantage offered by LMF in 
terms of DDoS Attack on Broker or OBM in terms of LSB. 
On LSB, all Brokers or OBMs are part of the same Overlay 
Network, which is in the same Broadcast Domain. 
Although LSB has a period-consensus mechanism, this 
mechanism will limit the transaction process when an attack 
occurs. The number of brokers available in LMF is smaller 
than the number of brokers available in LSB. It is because 
of the separation of broadcast domains. Hence, this 
mechanism will increase latency and time for transactions 
to be processed. 
LMF Backup Mechanism. LMF also has a backup 
mechanism, by using Cloud-nodes that consist of 
transactions stored on the backup storage. The transaction 
that is previously stored on the failed nodes or problem 
Broadcast Domain due to outage or attacks can be accessed 
and verified by another Broker and nodes in different 
Broadcast Domain. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed Lightweight Multi-Fog (LMF) Blockchain, 
that integrates the LSB and FogBus algorithms is proposed 
to reduce delays that appear in FogBus and improve 
availability and integrity by separating the Broadcast 
Domain. LMF increases integrity by using the Broadcast 
Domain separation model. Broadcast Domain is separating 
transaction and process on each Broadcast Domain. LMF 
also has a location verification mechanism to make sure the 
requestor transactions are processed in their nearest 
Broadcast Domain and protect Brokers from unauthorized 
transactions using the location checking mechanism. 
LMF is expected can increase availability by processing 
the transaction on the nearest Broadcast Domain, decrease 
the delay, have fault-tolerance mechanism combined from 
LSB and FogBus and Backup mechanism in Cloud. So, 
when an attack on a Broadcast Domain happens, it cannot 
impact transaction and process in another Broadcast 
Domain. Each Broadcast Domain have a different chain.  
LMF is not yet implemented and tested for performance, 
resource consumption, and latency. So, future work is 
needed to simulate the LMF model and compare it with 
FogBus and LSB. Simulation or Implementation can be 
done in the future to get a better understanding of 
performance, resource consumption and latency of LMF. 
SDN and NFV technology can be implemented in LMF 
Blockchain IoT to create more efficient nodes and 
processes [20]. 
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